A dual-signaling mechanism with distracted consumers
报告题目：A dual-signaling mechanism with distracted consumers
报告人：陈静 教授
报告时间：11月6日 14:30-16:30
报告地点：成都校区博学楼B401、南充校区完井楼401（线上）
报告人简介：
陈静，加拿大Dalhousie University管理学院管理科学与信息系统系讲席教授（William A. Black Chair in Commerce），2008毕业于加拿大University of Western Ontario毅伟商学院，获管理科学博士学位。目前，她担任了运营管理领域国际权威期刊OMEGA、JORS、ITOR等副主编，是加拿大人文与社会科学联合会董事会成员（Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences in Canada）。陈静老师的研究兴趣包括渠道竞争与供应链管理、运营管理与营销交叉研究、顾客退货管理等，目前已在相关领域国际权威期刊Journal of Retailing、Decision Sciences、EJOR、NRL、OMEGA等发表论文90余篇，同时她在全球顶尖案例库IVEY Publishing发表了教学案例22篇。
报告内容摘要：
This study develops a two-period dynamic signaling model to examine a firm selling electronic products with price markdowns, where product quality is private information. The firm may use a price guaranteestrategy, offering refunds to early buyers if prices drop in the second period. We consider consumer forgetfulness and strategic waiting behavior, finding that the price guarantee strategy, alongside pricing, signals high quality, helping distinguish the high-quality firm from the low-quality one under moderate distraction. High distraction leads both firm types to offer price guarantees, while low distraction leads neither to do so. We also show that the price guarantee option can curb consumer waiting due to quality uncertainty, though its effect on total sales varies with consumer distraction and firm type. We identify conditions under which the price guarantee option benefits both the firm and consumers, and show that the high-quality firm is more inclined to offer price guarantee under quality information asymmetry.
主办单位：人文社科处
经济管理学院
能源安全与低碳发展重点实验室
四川石油天然气发展研究中心
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